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Abstract: An protocol of quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with
four states is presented. We show that this protocol can make the Trojan horse attack with a
multi-photon signal, the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs, the attack with single photons, and
the attack with invisible photons to be nullification. In addition, we also give the upper bounds of
the average success probabilities for dishonest agent eavesdropping encryption using the fake-signal
attack with any two-particle entangled states.
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Recently we proposed a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol between multiparty (m members in group 1) and
multiparty (n members in group 2) using a sequence of single photons [1]. In our protocol, all members in group 1
directly encode their respective keys on the states of single photons via unitary operations, then the last one (the mth
member of group 1) sends 1/n of the resulting qubits to each of group 2. After each member of group 2 measures
the photons, the two groups share the secret messages. Unfortunately, Li et al. [2] pointed out that if the mth party
of group 1 is dishonest, she can obtain secret by substituting a sequence of single photons or a sequence of Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs generated by himself for the original photons without the detection of the other parties.
In this paper, we present a protocol of quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with four states
which is an improvement of the one in [1] and show that this improved protocol can prevent dishonest member from
this kind cheating. Moreover, the present protocol is also secure against the Trojan horse attack with a multi-photon
signal [3], the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs [4] and the attack with invisible photons [5]. We also give the upper
bounds of the average success probabilities for dishonest agent eavesdropping encryption using the fake-signal attack
with any two-particle entangled states.
I. REVIEW OF THE ORIGINAL QSS PROTOCOL BETWEEN MULTIPARTY AND MULTIPARTY
WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT
Suppose that there are m (m ≥ 2) and n (n ≥ 2) members in group 1 and group 2, respectively, and Alice 1, Alice
2, · · · , Alice m, and Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n are their respective all members. Group 1 wants quantum key sharing
with group 2 such that neither part of each group nor the combination of a part of group 1 and a part of group 2
knows the key, but only all members of each group can collaborate to determine what the string (key) is. The original
QSS protocol between multiparty and multiparty without entanglement [1] is briefly summarized as follows:
(M1) Alice 1 chooses two random nN -bit strings A1 and B1. She encodes each bit a
1
k of A1 as |ψa1kb1k〉, where b1k is
the corresponding bit of B1,
|ψ00〉 = |0〉,
|ψ10〉 = |1〉,
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√2 ,
|ψ11〉 = |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√2 .
(1)
Then she sends the resulting nN -qubit state |Ψ1〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa1kb1k〉 to Alice 2.
(M2) Alice 2 creates two random nN -bit strings A2 and B2. She applies σ0 = I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| or σ1 = iσy =
|0〉〈1|− |1〉〈0| to each qubit |ψa1
k
b1
k
〉 of nN -qubit state |Ψ1〉 according to the corresponding bit of A2 being 0 or 1, then
she applies I or H = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|+ 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)〈1| to each qubit of the resulting nN -qubit state depending on the
corresponding bit of B2 being 0 or 1. After that, she sends Alice 3 the resulting nN -qubit state |Ψ2〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa2kb2k〉.
(M3) Alice i does likewise, i = 3, 4, · · · ,m. After Alice m finishes her unitary operations on each single photon, she
sends N -qubit state ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+lbmnj+l〉 to Bob l, 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
(M4) Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n receive N qubits, and announce this fact, respectively.
2(M5) Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice m publicly announce the strings B1, B2, · · · , and Bm, respectively.
(M6) Bob l measures each of his qubit |ψam
nj+l
bm
nj+l
〉 in the Z basis {|0〉, |1〉} (if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 0) or in the X basis
{|+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
} (if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 1), j = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, l = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(M7) All Alices select randomly a subset that will serve as a check on Eve’s interference, and tell all Bobs the bits
they choose. In the check procedure, all Alices and Bobs are required to broadcast the values of their checked bits,
and compare the XOR results of the corresponding bits of checked bits of A1, A2, · · · , Am and the values of the
corresponding bits of Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n. If more than an acceptable number disagree, they abort this
round of operation and restart from first step.
(M8) The XOR results ⊕nl=1(⊕mi=1ainjs+l) of Bob l’s corresponding bits ⊕mi=1ainjs+l of the remaining bits
njs + l of {⊕mi=1ainj+1}N−1j=0 , {⊕mi=1ainj+2}N−1j=0 , · · · , {⊕mi=1ainj+n}N−1j=0 (or ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+1bmnj+1〉, ⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+2bmnj+2〉, · · · ,
⊗N−1j=0 |ψamnj+nbmnj+n〉) can be used as key bits for secret sharing between all Alices and all Bobs.
There exist security flaws in this protocol. The details are as follows.
1. Alice 1 is a dishonest agent. Alice 1 prepares nN EPR pairs in the state ⊗nNk=1|Φk〉, where |Φk〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 +
|11〉)EA. Alice 1 holds particle E of each EPR pair and sends the sequence SA of ⊗nNk=1|Φk〉 to Alice 2. She does not
intercept SA until SA is sent to Alice i1 + 1 (or Bobs). Note that after all operations of Alice 2, · · · , and Alice i1 (or
Alice m), |Φk〉 is transformed into one of the states
|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, 1√
2
(|Φ−〉+ |Ψ+〉), 1√
2
(|Φ−〉 − |Ψ+〉), (2)
which are mutually orthogonal. Here
|Φ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (3)
Since orthogonal states can be distinguish with certainty, Alice 1 never makes a mistake and can steal encoding
information of Alice 2, · · · , and Alice i1 (or all Alices) freely and fully. In this way, Alice 1 can steal all Alices
encryption fully and freely. After that, whether Alice 1 sends Bobs single photons or she sends Bobs EPR pairs, she
and all Bobs share successfully the secret messages shared by all Alices and all Bobs.
2. Alice i0 (1 ≤ i0 ≤ m) is a dishonest agent. Alice i0 generates nN EPR pairs in the state ⊗nNk=1|Φk〉 as above
Alice 1, where |Φk〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉)EA. When all Alices complete their respective operations in (M1)-(M3), Alice
i0 intercepts |Ψm〉, substitute SA for |Ψm〉, and sends N particles of the sequence SA of ⊗nNk=1|Φk〉 to each Bob l.
Alice i0 can obtain the original secret message by cheating without the detection of other parties, which is the same
as Alice m using the attack with EPR pairs in [2].
However, all the weaknesses above can be avoided by the following improved QSS protocol.
II. THE IMPROVEMENT OF QSS PROTOCOL BETWEEN MULTIPARTY AND MULTIPARTY
WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT
Now we give the improved quantum secret sharing scheme as follows.
M1. Alice 1 begins with two random classical bit strings A1 = {a11, a12, · · · , a1nN} and B1 = {b11, b12, · · · , b1nN}, where
a1k and b
1
k are uniformly chosen from {0, 1}. She then encodes these strings as a block of nN qubits,
|Ψ1〉 = ⊗nNk=1|ψa1kb1k〉
= ⊗N−1j=0 |ψa1nj+1b1nj+1〉|ψa1nj+2b1nj+2〉 · · · |ψa1nj+nb1nj+n〉,
(4)
where a1k is the kth bit of A1 (and similar for B1), each qubit |ψa1kb1k〉 is in one of the four states in Eq.(1). The
value of b1k determines the basis. If b
1
k is 0 then a
1
k is encoded in the Z basis {|0〉, |1〉}; if b1k is 1 then a1k is encoded
in the X basis {|+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
}. Because the four states are not all mutually orthogonal, therefore no
measurement can distinguish between all of them with certainty. Alice 1 then sends |Ψ1〉 to Alice 2 over their public
quantum communication channel.
M2. When Alice i receives signals sent by Alice i− 1, she selects randomly a large subset of photons as the samples
for eavesdropping check. First, she use a special filter to prevent the invisible photons from entering the operation
system. Then she splits each sample signal with a photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50), and measures each signal
in the measurement basis (MB) Z, or X at random [3]. Evidently if two photons in one signal are detected, then
3Alice i will abort the communication. Moreover, she asks Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice i − 1 to tell her their encoding
information ats, b
t
s of the samples in a random sequential order. After that, she analyzes the error rate εs of the
samples she measured in MB Z or X if ⊕i−1t=1bts = 0 or 1, respectively. In other words, Alice i analyzes the error rate
εs of the samples she measured in the same basis with |ψai−1s bi−1s 〉. If the error rate of the samples is higher than a
threshold εr, then Alice i aborts the quantum communication. Otherwise she goes ahead. Here s is the label of the
sample chosen for eavesdropping check, and i = 2, 3, · · · ,m.
Clearly the test steps can avoid the Trojan horse attack with a multi-photon signal [3] and the attack with invisible
photons [5].
M3. Alice i creates a quaternary string Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · , ainN+mi−1} and a binary string Bi =
{bi1, bi2, · · · , binN+mi−1}, where aik and bik are uniformly chosen from {0, 1, 2, 3} and {0, 1}, respectively. For each
|ψai−1
k
b
i−1
k
〉 of the nN +mi−1 qubit state |Ψi−1〉 = ⊗nN+mi−1i=1 |ψai−1
k
b
i−1
k
〉 , she performs the operation σ0, σ1, σ2 or
σ3 on it depending on the corresponding a
i
k of Ai is 0, 1, 2 or 3, respectively. Simultaneously she has to operate the
qubit with I or a Hadamard operator H according to the bit bik in Bi is 0 or 1, respectively. Here
σ0 = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
σ1 = iσy = −|1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|,
σ2 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|,
σ3 = σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
H =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)〈0|+ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)〈1|. (5)
Alice i making these unitary operations is equal to the encryption on the states of single photons. The resulting
state of this qubit is denoted by |ψai
k
bi
k
〉. After that Alice i inserts randomly mi −mi−1 decoy single photons into
nN+mi−1 photons encoded by her, where each of the decoy single photons is randomly in one of the states in Eq.(1).
Here i = 2, 3, · · · ,m.
M4. Alice i sends the photons (nN+mi qubits in the state |Ψi〉 = ⊗nN+mii=1 |ψaikbik〉) to Alice i+1 (i = 2, 3, · · · ,m−1).
After Alice m completes her encoding operations and randomly inserts mm −mm−1 decoy single photons, she sends
nN +mm photons to Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , Bob n in a sequential order.
M5. When all Bob 1, Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n have received their respective strings of qubits, each of them first
randomly and independently chooses sufficient samples to make measurement in MB Z, or X randomly. Then they
ask Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , and Alice m to announce publicly the ais, bis, of the samples in a random sequential order.
Here i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. After that all Bobs publish their measurement outcomes and the MBs. If the error rate of the
samples is higher than a threshold, then they abort the quantum communication. Otherwise they go to the next step.
M6. All Alices ask all Bobs to delete the decoy qubits which are not chosen for eavesdropping check. All members
in group 1 publicly announce the strings B1, B2, · · · , Bm in a random sequential order.
M7. Bob l (l = 1, 2, · · · , n) measures each of their qubits with the MB Z or X according to the XOR results of the
corresponding bits in the strings B1, B2, · · · , Bm. That is, Bob l measures |ψam
nj+l
bm
nj+l
〉 in the Z basis if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 0
or in the X basis if ⊕mi=1binj+l = 1. From his measurement on |ψamnj+lbmnj+l〉, he obtains the outcome dnj+l, which is 0
or 1, corresponding to the +1 and −1 eigenstates of σx and σz.
M8. All members in group 1 complete the error rate analysis of the transmission between the two groups. To this
end, all Alices require each of the member in group 2 to publish a subset of the measurement results chosen randomly,
and analyze the error rates of the samples. If the channel is secure, the XOR results of measurement outcomes of Bob
1, Bob 2, · · · , and Bob n’s corresponding bits can be used as key bits for secret sharing, otherwise they discard the
results obtained and re-try the quantum communication from the beginning.
III. SECURITY
Obviously, the test in M2 can make the attack with invisible photons [5] and the Trojan horse attack [3] to be
nullification. The checking procedure in M5 can avoid the attack with single photons and the attack with EPR pairs
[2]. The fake-signal attack with EPR pairs [4] can be detected by the operations in M3 and the check in M2 and M5.
The security of this present QSS protocol against the attacks in [2, 4] are discussed as follows.
4A. The security against the attack with single photons and the attack with EPR pairs
Now, we show that the attack stated in Ref. [2] is easily detected in the present quantum secret sharing.
Apparently, Bob’s measurements on the checked samples collapse them into the states ( in Eq.(1) ) of single photons.
In other words, all Bob’s measurements on the checked samples remove the entanglements between checked photons
and other eavesdropping particles, which corresponds to that the attacker Alice i0 sends Bobs single quantum states
in Eq.(1) whether in the attack with EPR pairs or in the attack with single photons [2]. Thus, all Alices and all
Bobs can find out the attacker in the attack with single photons via all Alices’ publishing their respective encoding
information in a random sequential order. Since Bob l asks Alices to announce ais and b
i
s in a random sequential order,
the attacker will not be the last one to answer the Bob l’s enquiry with a probability m−1
m
. If there is an Alice to be
asked after the attacker Alice i0, Alice i0 can only guess a
i0
s and b
i0
s to answer the inquiry as she can not distinguish
the quantum state intercepted by her with certainty. It is easy to derive that the error rate of the samples that Bobs
measured in MB Z or X according to ⊕mi=1bis=0 or 1 is more than m−12m .
B. The security against the fake-signal attack with EPR pairs
The present QSS protocol is secure against any dishonest agent eavesdropping secret using the fake-signal attack
with EPR pairs [4]. We shall actually show that this protocol is secure against more general attack, the fake-signal
attack with any two-particle entangled states (general EPR pairs). Next let us see how this works in detail.
Suppose that the malicious party Alice i0 who may be any dishonest one of Alices, generates nN + m
i0 general
EPR pairs in the state ⊗nN+mi0k=1 |φk〉, where
|φk〉 = |φ〉 = |0〉A|α〉E + |1〉A|β〉E , (6)
|α〉E and |β〉E are unnormalized states of the S-level (S ≥ 2) particle E. Note that when
〈α|β〉 = 〈β|α〉 = 0, 〈α|α〉 = 〈β|β〉 = 1
2
, (7)
|φk〉 = |φ〉 is an EPR pair, that is, EPR pair is the special case of |φ〉. Alice i0 replaces each of the original single
photons |Ψi0〉 with a fake signal, the general EPR pair |φk〉 and sends the sequence SA of nN +mi0 particles A in
⊗nN+mi0k=1 |φk〉 to Alice i0 + 1 while each particle E in ⊗nN+m
i0
k=1 |φk〉 is held by herself. If |φ〉 is not a two-particle
maximally entangled state, then the cheating of Alice i0 can be found by Alice i0 + 1 in M2, because Alice i0 can
not distinguish between |α〉 and |β〉 and between |α〉+ |β〉 and |α〉 − |β〉 perfectly, it is a certain that Alice i0 makes
mistakes. Next we only assume that |φ〉 is an EPR pair. Alice i0 + 1 in the step M2 cannot detect this cheating as
Alice i0 is able to produce no errors in the results if Alice i0 is asked to announce her encryption a
i0
s and b
i0
s of the
samples after Alice 1, · · · , Alice i0 − 1. But if Alice i0 is not the last to announce her encoding information, then
her cheating introduces errors and can be found out by Alice i0 + 1 in M2 without fail. However, when the dishonest
Alice i0 is Alice 1, this cheating of her cannot be found out by Alice 2 as it does not introduce errors in the results.
Alice 1 intercepts SA while it was sent to Alice i1 (2 < i1 ≤ m) or Bobs (evidently, if Alice 1 never intercepts SA,
then she can not obtain any information, though this kind of eavesdropping can not be found in the eavesdropping
check. So it does not make any sense for Alice 1 to do this kind of eavesdropping ). Note that the result of the
encryptions by Alice 2, · · · , Alice i1 − 1 or Alice m in step M3 is equivalent to one Alice’s operations in M3 (that is,
one Alice performs one of operations σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, Hσ0, Hσ1, Hσ2, Hσ3 on each particle A). This is because of
Hσ1H = −σ1, Hσ2H = σ3, Hσ3H = σ2, H2 = σ2u = I, σuσv = −σvσu for u, v = 1, 2, 3.
The object of Eve is to get all Alices’ encoding information Ai and Bi. Therefore, Alice 1 must manage to distinguish
5the eight operations σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, Hσ0, Hσ1, Hσ2, and Hσ3 with which |φ〉 is transformed into one of eight states
|ϕ1〉 = σ0|φ〉 = |0〉|α〉+ |1〉|β〉,
|ϕ2〉 = σ1|φ〉 = −|1〉|α〉+ |0〉|β〉,
|ϕ3〉 = σ2|φ〉 = |0〉|α〉 − |1〉|β〉,
|ϕ4〉 = σ3|φ〉 = |1〉|α〉+ |0〉|β〉,
|ϕ5〉 = Hσ0|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|α〉 + 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|β〉,
|ϕ6〉 = Hσ1|φ〉 = − 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|α〉+ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|β〉,
|ϕ7〉 = Hσ2|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|α〉 − 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|β〉,
|ϕ8〉 = Hσ3|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)|α〉 + 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|β〉, (8)
where |φ〉 is an EPR pair (i.e. |α〉 and |β〉 satisfy Eq.(7)). In other words, she is to distinguish the eight states. The
eight states in Eq.(8) belongs to the subspace W of the entire Hilbert space H spanned by |0〉|α〉, |0〉|β〉, |1〉|α〉 and
|1〉|β〉. Obviously, the dimension dimW of subspace W is less than or equal to 4. It implies that it is impossible for
all eight states in Eq.(8) being mutually orthogonal, so these eight states can not be reliably distinguished [6]. Thus
Alice 1’s eavesdropping can be detected in M2 by Alice i1 or M5 by all Bobs. Therefore the fake-signal attack with
EPR pairs can not work for the present quantum secret sharing protocol.
On the other hand, in the present protocol, Alices insert randomly decoy single photons into the signal photons in
M3. The eavesdropping check on the decoy single photons is the same as that on the signal photons. That is, first
Alice i measures (or all Bobs measure) each decoy single photon in MB Z, or X at random, then she asks (they ask)
Alice 1, Alice 2, · · · , Alice i − 1 (all Alices) to tell her (them) their encoding information ats, bts of the samples in a
random sequential order. Note that there is at least one honest agent in one communication group. Therefore the
dishonest agent can be found by the eavesdropping checks on the decoy photons by the honest agents. The principle
of the checking procedures is the same as that in BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [6].
Remark 1. If only Alice 2 is honest in group 1, and all Alices except Alice 2 collude, the cheating of Alice 1 can be
found out by all Bobs in the step M5.
Remark 2. Alice 1 can not unambiguously discriminate four sets
{|ϕ11〉, |ϕ12〉}, {|ϕ21〉, |ϕ22〉}, {|ϕ31〉, |ϕ32〉}, {|ϕ41〉, |ϕ42〉},
(9)
where
|ϕ11〉 = |ϕ1〉, |ϕ12〉 = |ϕ5〉, |ϕ21〉 = |ϕ2〉, |ϕ22〉 = |ϕ6〉,
|ϕ31〉 = |ϕ3〉, |ϕ32〉 = |ϕ7〉, |ϕ41〉 = |ϕ4〉, |ϕ42〉 = |ϕ8〉.
(10)
This will be given later. Even if Alice 1 can correctly classify the four sets in (9), she will be detected in the step M2
by Alice i1 or in the step M5 by all Bobs as she produces errors when answering Alice i1’ or all Bobs’ enquiry.
Remark 3. It is not necessary for Alice i (2 ≤ i ≤ m) performing four operations σ0, σ1, σ2 and σ3 in M3. In fact,
Alice i only needs to use three operations either σ0, σ1, σ2 or σ0, σ1, σ3.
Next we will calculate the upper bounds of the average success probabilities of the two cases, one is to distinguish
the eight states in Eq.(8), the other is to classify the four sets in (9), where |φ〉 is a two-particle entangled state.
Case I. The upper bound of the average success probability distinguishing the eight states in Eq.(8). Let
x = 〈α|β〉 + 〈β|α〉,
q =
1
i
(〈α|β〉 − 〈β|α〉),
z = 〈α|α〉,
t = 〈β|β〉,
z + t = 1, (11)
6we have
8∑
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉|
= 8|q|+ 8|z − t|+ 8|x|+ 8√
2
|z − t+ x|
+
8√
2
|z − t− x|+ 16√
2
√
1 + q2. (12)
It follows that minimum of
∑8
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉| can be realized if
q = 0, z = t =
1
2
, x = 0. (13)
It means that the minimum of
∑8
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉| occurs when |φk〉 is an EPR pair.
The minimum of
∑8
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉| is
Min
8∑
i,j=1
i6=j
|〈ϕi|ϕj〉| = 16√
2
. (14)
The average success probability P1 [7] for unambiguous identification of the eight states in Eq.(8) satisfies
P1 ≤ 1− 1
M − 1
8∑
i,j=1
i6=j
√
pipj |〈ϕi|ϕj〉|
= 1− 1
56
× 16√
2
= 1−
√
2
7
< 1, (15)
where M = 8 is the number of the states to be distinguished, pi =
1
8 and pj =
1
8 are the prior probabilities of |ϕi〉
and |ϕj〉, respectively.
Case II. The upper bound of the average success probability classifying the four sets in Eq.(9). By calculation, we
obtain that
4∑
i,j=1
i6=j
2∑
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N −mi)(N −mj) |〈ϕik|ϕjl〉|
=
4∑
i,j=1
i6=j
2∑
k,l=1
√
1
8 × 18
(8− 2)× (8 − 2) |〈ϕik|ϕjl〉|
=
1
12
(2|y|+ 1√
2
|z − t− x|+ 2|z − t|
+
4√
2
√
1 + q2 + 2|x|+ 1√
2
|z − t+ x|). (16)
Here N = 8 is the total number of the states in the four classified sets in (9), mi is the number of the states of the
i-th set, and ηik is the prior probability of |ϕik〉.
A little thought shows that
4∑
i,j=1
i6=j
2∑
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N −mi)(N −mj) |〈ϕik|ϕjl〉| ≥
√
2
6
, (17)
7and the equality holds if
x = 0, z = t =
1
2
, q = 0, (18)
that is, the minimum of
∑4
i,j=1
i6=j
∑2
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N−mi)(N−mj) |〈ϕik|ϕjl〉| reaches when |φ〉 is an EPR pair.
The average success probability P2 of conclusive quantum states sets classification [8] is
P2 ≤ 1−
4∑
i,j=1
i6=j
2∑
k,l=1
√
ηikηjl
(N −mi)(N −mj) |〈ϕik|ϕjl〉|
= 1−
√
2
6
< 1. (19)
From (15) and (19), no matter what kind strategy the malicious Alice i0 use, she will disturb the quantum system,
make mistakes, and therefore can be detected in M2, M5 and M8. Consequently, the present QSS protocol is secure not
only against the fake-signal attacking with EPR pairs but also against the fake-signal attacking with any two-particle
entangled states—general EPR pairs.
This present QSS protocol is an improvement of original QSS protocol [1]. In the present QSS protocol, we add
the special filters, photon number splitters, single-photon detectors, the eavesdropping check of each member Alice i
(i = 2, 3, · · · ,m) in group 1, decoy single photons, two operations σx and σz, and the random measurements of all
Bobs on their respective qubits chosen at random. It is the improvement that makes the attacks pointed in [2, 3, 4, 5]
to be of no effect (to be nullification). The principle of the checking procedures is the same as that in BB84 quantum
key distribution protocol. So the transmission of qubits between authorized members in the two groups is secure.
That is, the present QSS protocol between multiparty and multiparty with four states is secure.
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